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Resumo
Recompondo Humpty-Dumpty? Tendências e 
Questões de Efi cácia no Multilateralismo
Desde há muito que o multilateralismo tem os seus 
paladinos. A União Europeia tem seguramente 
estado na linha da frente da sua defesa – desig-
nadamente como tributo para o seu próprio soft 
power e enquanto expressão de ideais tais como 
a criação de um sistema internacional baseado em 
regras e instituições. Tal tem tido lugar num qua-
dro em que o andar dos processos internacionais 
não tem dado apoio claro à noção de que estes 
seriam objectivos exequíveis e na ausência de cor-
roborações regulares de um sucesso da estratégia 
de abordagem pela via do soft power da União. 
Talvez não surpreendentemente, nos últimos anos 
a UE tem começado a teorizar condições de ins-
titucionalização de um “multilateralismo efi cien-
te” – a sugestão implícita sendo a de que, caso 
bem gizado, o multilateralismo pode de facto vir a 
produzir frutos. Por intermédio de três exemplos 
e de um thought experiment, essas invocações 
são criticamente avaliadas. A atenção centra-se 
em três processos – o envolvimento com a África 
subsaariana, o Processo de Paz do Médio Oriente, 
e o EuroMed – e nas várias medidas correctivas 
por via das quais a UE tem tentado desenhar 
abordagens multilaterais mais “efi cientes”. A 
discussão é lavada a cabo tanto no contexto da 
efi cácia como no da legitimação.
Abstract
Multilateralism has for a long time had its paladins. 
For one, the EU has of late been at the forefront of its 
defense – namely as a tribute to its own “soft power”
and as an expression of ideals such as that of the 
creation of an institution and rule-based international 
system. This has come about even as international 
political processes give no clear support to the claim 
that these are achievable aims and absent any sustained 
evidence of success for EU’s soft power approaches. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the EU has lately begun 
theorizing conditions for institutionalizing an 
“effective multilateralism” – the suggestion being that, 
if duly engaged in, multilateralism may indeed come to 
work to task. By means of three examples and a thought 
experiment, such claims are critically evaluated. The 
focus is placed on three processes –engagement with 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East Peace Process, 
and EuroMed – and various corrective moves through 
means of which the EU is vying for more “effective” 
multilateral approaches. The discussion is placed in 
the context of both effi cacy and legitimacy.
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For many years now, multilateralism has been hailed as a panacea and one 
to which the EU is particularly prone1. Much as I think multilateralism is indeed 
on the rise – and that this is a good thing – I also deem it is high-time for that 
perception to be duly nuanced. To my mind, the theme I chose to address is a 
diffi cult one, but it is also certainly both rich and timely. It is timely since it shows 
that diplomats and politicians concerned with foreign affairs have moved into a 
pro-active search for a better adaptation – and thus a greater effectiveness – of their 
external engagements, looking for policy design in manners which are strategic 
rather than merely tactical and reactive. While it is not clear that they will manage 
to fi nd successful blueprints, it is surely interesting to note the quest is ongoing. 
To my mind, the theme is also rich, and I believe this refl ects a growing awareness 
– arising in Portugal, in Romania, and in the rest of the European Union, and very 
much everywhere else as well – that the international environment is changing in 
fundamental ways. The fact that for some years now the theme of “effi ciency in 
multilateralism” has been discussed in all sorts of fora manifests a new “conventional 
wisdom” on what is nowadays called for in terms of research and understanding 
of the internal dynamics of a contemporary international system which was quite 
different only a few years ago2.
So what may I say about such a well-worn topic that could be of any interest? 
In this as in all cases, one should start by trying to put things into perspective. 
Multilateralism does, of course, have a long history – as has belief in multilateralism 
as a formula. But this has also been a history of changes in its modalities, following 
pressures for adaptation which are, again, making themselves felt. Inside and outside 
Europe a new kind of multilateralism has been brewing which (although we may 
argue it has of late scored some successes) has yet to fi nd its way and still has to 
prove its real worth. For lack of a better term, and as a means of pinpointing its 
 1 This paper is partially based on the text of a presentation in Poiana Braşov, Transylvania, 
Romania, on the 31st October 2008. The venue was the XVIIIth edition of the The International 
Course for Young Diplomats ‘Nicolae Titulescu’. The general theme of the 2008 Course, which I was 
asked to ‘wrap up’ in a Key-Note talk, was “Multilateralism between legitimacy and effi ciency at the 
start of the 21st century”. Given the dryness of the topic, I deliberately retain, in this published 
version, the oral characteristics of my original manuscript.
 2 To the extent this prise de conscience has involved diplomats from all over the world, this pairing 
of awareness is signifi cant. When we speak of diplomacy, or of international politics, we must 
be sensitive to the evidence that it is really not possible to dissociate these two dynamics – a 
fi rst one, which is related to the fl uidity of contemporary international environments, and 
another, a second one, linked to our new political modalities of response to it. This muddle is 
indeed what makes my theme a diffi cult one – on top of the fact that, of course, guessing at 
the future is always a hazardous enterprise, particularly when we are challenged to do so in 
rapidly shifting regional and global contexts, as is nowadays patently the case.
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biting edge, it has been called effective multilateralism – the expression underlines a 
model for ‘resolving’ one of the most problematic domains of the urgently needed 
reconfi guration of an old international procedural mechanism used for ensuring an 
acceptable Westphalian form of political participation of different actors, namely 
multi-laterality.
At one level, the eventual success aimed at by the contemporary policy quest 
– the hopes of those blessed by an often deeply held conviction that multilateralism 
may be a key for the solution of some of the apparently irreducible confl icts of 
interest we face – is of little relevance: the attempt itself is interesting and well 
worth trying to understand. For believers, holding on to the conviction is an essential 
exercise, to be sure. In the ever more unstable and less predictable international 
scenarios in which we fi nd ourselves (after 1989 in Berlin, 1991 in Moscow, 1991 
and 1992 in Baghdad and Mogadishu, 1995 and 1996 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1999 
in the Kosovo, 2001 in New York, Washington, and then Afghanistan, 2003 in Iraq, 
2004 and 2005 in Madrid and London, and August 2008 in Georgia), it is surely 
absolutely crucial that we rapidly manage to re-design multilateral procedures so 
as to bring them up to speed – at least for those who trust their eventual effi cacy 
as a panacea. And it is deemed urgent that we do so, maybe not simply out of a 
messianic set of beliefs, but also out of realist prudence.
But the effort is not merely worthwhile for those who actually place trust on the 
effi cacy of multilateral procedures. For the more cynically inclined – or at least the 
more uncertain ones – the very effort itself of trying to establish ‘effective’ forms 
of multilateralism deserves careful and detailed critical analysis – if only to spot 
its insuffi ciencies and thus prepare the ground for ‘less unrealistic’ alternatives. 
This means both identifying obstacles in the current formats of multi-laterality and 
then surmounting them by the stipulation of new rules of the game – and perhaps, 
even, by devising a new game-plan which may, or may not, include it – and if they 
include ‘effective multilateralism’ may have to do so in a mitigated manner. Albeit 
I partake of some of the hesitations of cynics as far as these matters are concerned, 
in this presentation I shall stop short of taking such a last step.
Without excessive ambitions, in the next few pages I try to sketch a few ideas 
on how the choices may be carried out – while noting some of the diffi culties 
with which we still have to cope in deciding if multilateralism may really be 
adequately reformed. In what follows, I shall start with a few ideas on the concept 
of multilateralism, mostly on the notion of what many recent European authors have 
come to call effective multilateralism. From there I will go on to a brief circumscription 
(identifi cation would be too strong a word for my efforts, I think) of some of the 
most important lacunae, or gaps, remaining in our European approach to the new 
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emergent type of multilateralism and our generation of it – and I will advance some 
suggestions on how we should try to deal with the various outstanding issues this 
brings forth. I will then move on to argue that a more active European participation 
(in the sense of a more effi cacious one) of the international arenas today requires from 
us a careful refl ection on the specifi c ‘rules of engagement’ that we actually use to 
interact with contemporary international scenarios – namely on the possible modes 
of multilateralism with which to pattern that very engagement, but also more than 
that. My point here will be to show the inconclusiveness of the available data on 
EU multilateral efforts: the EU has not used multilateralism in a suffi ciently robust 
way for our experiences to constitute convincing tests as to its real worth. Finally, 
I shall use the opportunity to make a few more general comments on some of the 
details of the progression of multilateralism towards the present state of affairs 
Europe sees itself in, at this crucial post-Lisbon Treaty juncture – and in doing that, 
I will want to raise some questions which hopefully may be of use to trigger what 
I hope will be a fruitful subsequent discussion.
A word of caution, or rather a safeguard: throughout, my posture will be 
pragmatic, rather than purely theoretical, although I do not hesitate, here and there, 
to venture into concepts by taking a few ‘theoretical turns’.
On our European revision of the role of small and medium-sized States and 
other actors in the world
Some background is both useful and appropriate – and, although I shall touch 
upon nothing new, I will do it from an angle I consider useful for my purposes 
here: mapping issues. Recent years have witnessed an increased attentiveness to the 
importance and role of small and medium-sized States (be they European or not) 
as well as to those of other, non-State, actors, as global players. Namely, that has 
allowed us – indeed it has forced us – to leave behind earlier dismissive notions 
of non-State actors, and of small and medium-sized States, as rather light-weight 
powers, or even as ‘civilian’ ones. This, in turn, brought us a deeper understanding 
of these entities (Europe provides us with clear examples of what I am trying to 
convey) as promoters of what I shall call global public goods3, a contentious concept, 
 3 Following a classical economic defi nition, global public goods can be thought of as global goods 
which are, simultaneously, non-rivaled and non-excludable goods: that is, goods such that 
consumption of those goods by one individual does not reduce their availability for others, and 
that no one can be effectively excluded from using them. Air, heat, or, less trivially, knowledge 
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to be sure, but surely an emergent reality. Ponder on the following for a second. 
The list of such budding public goods includes, perhaps most importantly, security; 
and no State can, today, achieve that alone, either for itself, in terms of security and 
defense, say, or for others, in terms of international policing, for example.
Without more than merely skimming the surface of the matter, let me focus 
for a moment on the implications of abandoning our earlier dismissive notions. 
Note that as we construct a new ‘identity’ for small and medium-sized States and 
non-State entities in the contemporary post-bipolar and post 9/11 world (Europe 
remains a choice example), one of the foundations – and even touchstones – of the 
very act of building has been the re-designing of an effective multilateralism. So, we 
may ask, for example, what the reach of this assertion is, in the context of security 
as a regional, or even a global, public good?
At one level, of course, such a claim of an enhanced role of small and medium-sized 
States and other actors in the world simply refl ects a consciousness that we must 
work on the assumption that, in a globalizing international environment and in the 
presence of very powerful entities, small and mid-sized States and NGOs cannot 
achieve important objectives alone – and with this I want to stress the evidence this 
assertion actually refl ects a fi rm confi dence that it is important to build a rule-based 
alternative to both the superpower negotiations of old (or the Great Power ones of 
even older times) or instead of relying, simply, on the venerable bilateral strategic 
relations we got used to for so many generations before that. I also want to stress 
what appears to be an obvious corollary of such a move: that we, in Europe, tend 
to believe we must do so for the purpose of erecting robust forms of global governance, 
something we think globalization is sorely lacking – and see so we for example tend 
to envisage the current fi nancial (and soon also economic) crisis as an unfortunate 
event which has made evident to everyone. In Europe, in other words, we live under 
(according to Joseph E. Stiglitz and many others), downloadable shareware are obvious examples 
of this category. At a less tangible level, and for the purposes of the present communication, 
so are things like security, international rules of conduct, and international organizations. The 
class has been extensively used in academic publications in the last decade or so. For seminal 
UN-produced batches of empirical studies on the relatively recent concept of ‘global public 
goods’, see the two collections (eds.) Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern (1999), 
Global Public Goods, Oxford University Press, and (eds.) Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceição, Katell Le 
Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza (2003), Providing Global Public Goods. Managing Globalization, 
also at the Oxford University Press. For a criticism of the notion that security (not quite defi ned 
in the same way) could be a public good, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe (1989), “Fallacies of the 
Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security”, The Journal of Libertarian Studies IX, 1: 
27-46. For a more ‘constructivist’ reading which allows for a building of security as a bundle 
of global public goods, see Ian Loader and Neil Walker (2007), Civilizing Security, Cambridge 
University Press.
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the often deeply-held conviction that global institutions and multilateral approaches 
to international problem-solving, are appropriate responses to our current needs, and 
the desire they should be made more effective – even if, after repeatedly trying and 
failing to build security via such means, we end up concluding that they are in 
practice insuffi cient ones.
With this in mind, let me now begin to focus on effi ciency and multilateralism, 
my chosen theme. Effi cacy in multilateralism is not an easy objective to achieve, 
unless strong convergences are found or generated – something I shall want to come 
back to time and again here. And even when suffi cient levels of ‘internal’ effi cacy 
are reached, external ones – the co-optation, or at least the consent, of big powers 
– loom heavily on the horizon as a further barrier which must be overtaken if we are 
going to get anywhere with our hard-fought consensus. This, of course brings up a 
further problem, one which comes together with every major change, and that is: how 
do we make our new strategies legitimate (meaning, recognized, both internally and 
externally, as adequate, proportional, fi tting) – and thus followed by all. This is an 
issue I shall touch upon as I move along, without ever digging too deeply into it.
Again, allow to go back to my choice European paradigm and note that – perhaps 
indeed largely as a result of these kinds of considerations – the EU regularly claims 
to promote a certain model of international relations, a peaceful and voluntaristic 
style, which presumes a willingness, on both the side of Europeans and on that of 
its interlocutors, to play the game in that very way. The claim is backed by real 
action: the “normative plus public diplomacy” path along which we construct this 
identity of Europe in the world – or those of small or medium-powers, be they 
States or NGOs – is one of the major cornerstones of the building we are carrying 
out, so there really have been systematic attempts at an effective multilateralism, 
or plural dialogue, if you will. This is, of course, something that tends to go down 
well in terms of ‘legitimacy’. It goes without saying, of course, that it also means 
that in an international context where multilateralism is not the rule, the EU fi nds 
itself in an ever more diffi cult position as it tries to exert its infl uence. But that, 
when it does, it is again seen as doing something ‘noble’ – and thus somehow 
more legitimate. This is at the root, I would claim, of what we diffusely, and time 
and again somewhat disconcertingly, call ‘European soft-power’. In a famous 2007 
‘policy brief’, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard have talked about, in precisely this 
context, of the rise of ‘herbivorous powers’4.
 4 In their Ivan Krastev e Mark Leonard (2007) “New World Order: The Balance of Soft Power 
and the Rise of Herbivorous Powers”, Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, 
London.
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Why does Europe do that, why does Europe insist on threading that soft 
normative path? What is behind this European attitude, apart from the obvious 
fact that in the absence of hegemony, or of a decisive military potency, it is actually the 
only way for Europe to carry on – a sort of European default setting? Going back to 
what I stated earlier, this probably simply means Europe works on the basis of its 
awareness that it cannot achieve important objectives alone, and that it believes that 
it is important to build a rule-based alternative to bilateral relations, for the purpose 
of strategic macro-regional and global governance. In other words, Europe threads 
that path as a result of a realistic self-assessment of her own capacities – and so as 
to look good in the eyes of her interlocutors, of course.
In the face of weaknesses in such modeling, Europe often resorts a sort of defensive 
secondary elaborations, namely the claim that multilateralism in fact sometimes does 
not work according to plan, but when it does not this is mostly the outcome of 
poor design of the multilateral path taken. Looking back at the EU posture in the 
last few years brings that to the fore very clearly, or so I believe. We Europeans 
underpin our approach with the enthusiastic claim of a recognition that global 
institutions and multilateral approaches to international problem-solving are 
indeed appropriate responses to our current needs, but only if they are somehow 
rendered more effi cient. This is by no means a politically neutral claim: as a result, 
the EU ostensively promotes a certain model of international relations – and one 
which, note, to a large extent, reproduces Europe’s own fascinating experience of 
integration. So, no matter what cynics might want to throw at Europe, there is quite 
a substantial amount of good faith in our approach – even if, as many believe, it 
is a rather naïve one.
Note too that this notion of a more infl uential role of traditionally ‘obscure’ 
small or mid-sized powers (be they State or non-State ones), or of Europe5, in 
global affairs, is, of course, at least in European canonical interpretations of these 
matters, closely linked to the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ or the lack of 
it – and this is one belief that buttresses many of the changes we today witness 
in diplomacy and in even in foreign policy. How is this so? In a series of steps, I 
want to gradually and cumulatively break up these constructs by displaying their 
internal mechanics, as it were.
 5 I use the term ‘Europe’ here, as a short-cut expression, in the sense of the European Union, of 
course.
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On the idea, or notion, of effective multilateralism
The concept I am talking about, that of an institutionalized rule-based international 
future, stands out in the European Security Strategy as ‘the development of a stronger 
international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order’6. Although it might sound like wishful thinking, in fact this 
assertion is not very new, and not even very challenging. And it is noteworthy only 
for a lingering neo-realist inner fear that rule-based orders are ineffective things: 
the true political challenge we face, therefore, is to prove that such an order may 
produce desirable results. But is this really so? Are neo-realists completely wrong? 
Do rule-based orders really work?
For a programmatic expression of this, allow me to quote a politician and friend, 
the Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Professor João Cravinho, 
on a very similar point: “the challenge [facing this strengthening of international 
society and its rules and institutions] is in fact a considerable one, namely because 
it requires strong internal coordination and a common external position in a wide 
range of policy areas, and following from this there must be strong positions which 
must be backed up by appropriate resources, be they diplomatic, fi nancial or even 
occasionally military”7. A question: is this inventory of the problems we must face 
– coordination and convergence, and also means – a suffi cient one? And, if so, how 
does that translate into foreign policy?
I shall try to answer this in what follows, but fi rst a quick initial stock of 
what I have underlined so far. Independently of my intrinsic hesitations as to the 
 6 Much of what follows in this and the next subsection critically addresses rather directly the 
rather ‘politically cautious’ position of many EU ‘solidarists’, namely João Gomes Cravinho 
(2008), in “Putting Effective Multilateralism to the Test. The Case of EU Engagement in the 
Mediterranean, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa”, Negócios Estrangeiros 12. The quotation 
refers to the text of a presentation by the Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
and Cooperation, who presented his communication in Brussels, 11-12 October 2007, in the 
European Counsel, in the presence of the European High Representative, Javier Solana, at a 
Policy Planning Directors informal meeting which I co-Chaired during the third Portuguese 
Presidency of the European Union. Albeit my framework is rather different from his, in the 
present communication, delivered in Romania, I do not veer too far from João Cravinho’s 
position, whichI consider to be in many senses exemplary, albeit insuffi cient, at least as concerns 
the diffi culties faced to render contemporary multilateralism effective. Quite deliberately, in 
fact, I follow the template set by his paper. I do not, however, share the solidarist belief set 
– I deem this wishful thinking – which tends to see dialogue as suffi cient, particularly in an 
international order in which very real and irreducible confl icts of interest prevail.
 7 Ibid., João G. Cravinho, op. cit.: 12. Cravinho’s approach in this particular paper is of course 
much more ‘political’ and normative than my own.
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effectiveness of this ostensive European strategy, in short, I have hinted at the 
suggestion (or, at least, I have tried to insist) that, if we are to take the concept of 
a new institution and rule-based international order seriously, we must assume that 
effective multilateralism is much more than a general and abstract guiding principle. 
To be serious, we must actually believe effective multilateralism constitutes, rather, 
a very specifi c framework, albeit one that has clearly not yet been suffi ciently adapted 
to changed international circumstances, much less operationalised. We may want to 
refi ne this further: effective multilateralism, if we want to trust there is to be any 
hope at all it will work according to plan, should not be conceived merely as the 
sum total of our own individual engagements with the engagements of others. It 
must be both more and less than that and partly external to it; to work, it must be 
institutionalized – this is the very minimum we must believe if we want to claim 
we actually take at all seriously the concept of “a new institution and rule-based 
international order”.
The assertion may sound banal, but it is not. As we have painfully learned, 
achieving that institutionalization is not always as easy as it sounds. Tripwires 
abound – so at issue is not just our manifest lack of experience. For instance note, 
too, as indeed João Cravinho stressed in the paper I quoted above, that a really 
effective multilateralism has to be developed within the context of an international 
system which includes institutions and mechanisms that do not always function 
at all well – the still un-reformed UN is a sad example, here, as are the Bretton 
Woods institutions, another, still, is the rather inglorious Central Asian Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization8, to stick to a handful of cases only. Effective multilateral 
efforts are also embedded in the context of international norms that are sometimes 
ambiguous or even contradictory – such as the text of the UN Charter and that 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the relation between the rather 
new ‘responsibility, or duty, to protect’ and the rule of non-interference in the 
 8 A side-comment on a theme which does not relate directly to the resent paper, but that bears 
on it and, particularly, on the challenges facing effective multilateralism in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. For an interesting prospective six-year old study on the role of the Shanghai Five in 
the region, see Sean L. Yom (2002). “Power Politics in Central Asia. The Future of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization”, Harvard Asia Quarterly 6 (4): 48-54. On the general geopolitics of 
Central Asia, as concerns US-Russia relations, see Dmitri Trenin (2003), “A farewell to the 
‘Great Game’? Prospects for Russian-American security cooperation in Central Asia”, European 
Security, vol. 12, no. 3-4: 21-35. Given its different angle of approach, it os worth reading Sergej 
Mahnovski, Kamiljon T. Akramov e Theodore W. Karasik (2006), “Economic Dimensions of 
Security in Central Asia”, RAND Corporation. A more recent study, post-Georgia invasion 
and the 5 Day War, is Sergey Markedonov (2008), “Caucasus Confl ict Breaks Old Rules of the 
Game” Russian Analytical Digest, 45: 2-6, Zurich, www.res.ethz.ch.
Armando Marques Guedes
 225 Nação e Defesa
internal affairs of sovereign States; or, again, the tension, patent for instance in 
justifi cations offered for the recent invasion of Georgia by Russia between the 
Westphalian principle of the ‘sacredness’ of borders and the Wilsonian one of 
‘self-determination’.
It is easy to make further claims. Another barrier is more straightforward: many 
States are simply not really interested at all in multilateralism – or not for all matters. 
In actual fact, many oppose the very idea of having to negotiate with others in what 
concerns their protection of their own interests. Big powers take that sort of stance 
as a rule, but they are by no means the only ones, as a handful of contemporary 
small- or medium-sized ambitious States and non-State entities like the profusion 
of recent radical Islamist groupings clearly show us. All of this militates harshly 
against the operationalization of the idea, most surely. So this means that, while 
effective multilateralism represents a commonly accepted end-result, the necessary 
mechanisms, or ways, to move it forward in practical terms are, therefore, not always 
evident. Maybe they are not even possible. For those who believe in them, those 
mechanisms must be found, nevertheless, if we want to have any well-founded 
hope of infl uencing the future. Europe has led the way in such trust in multilateral 
‘composition of interests’. This is why I believe that it is vital that, as Europeans, 
should spend time sharing ideas on the meaning of the concept, and try to fi nd 
ways of possibly streamlining it and of making it operational – or, instead, to draw 
limits on our fashionable notions of its worth.
For believers, although this is most certainly not going to be an easy task, it 
is clear they consider it is not an impossible one. That trust should not come as 
a surprise: if we believe we can make multilateralism work, we need to identify 
diffi culties and then we must face up to the issues which we think hinder its 
effective operation and we must then try to resolve them one by one. So, taking a 
step back, what are these diffi culties, these hindrances – and are they surmountable 
by effective forms of multilateralism?
Some of the lacunae remaining in our procedural approach to the emergent 
multilateralism which global governance requires
Leaving aside, if only for a moment, all the ‘externalities’ which structurally 
militate against effective multilateralism, what, then, are the intrinsic lacunae that 
have to be fi lled-in if multilateral action is conceivably to be streamlined? Or, in 
other words, insofar as we trust its potential effectiveness, what should we do if we 
want to attempt to amplify its actual effi cacy as far as regional and global governance 
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are concerned? What are the challenges we face at this ‘internal’, technical, level in 
the pursuit of that aim? What should we have to readjust?
One particular challenge I have already touched upon is the sustained and 
coherent management of the complex maze of relations in which we currently 
operate in our globalizing world. Latching onto the European example again, I want 
to be fairly clear at the outset: surely if we want our multilateralism to be minimally 
effective, a careful management of it is vital. And this is not really there at all, yet 
– although, in practice, we seem to have reached some level of agreement on a 
joint vision of how this could be achieved: Europe, the “old Europe” at least, does 
seem to thrive for an institution- and rule-based international order and appears to 
trust the notion that it is indeed achievable. So what stands on our way, what are 
we not looking at that hinders success we believe the multilateral institution- and 
rule-based formula should have? Clearly identifying obstacles becomes crucial: if 
one holds that belief, surely a good strategy for surmounting the lack of mechanisms 
necessary for multilateral effi cacy will be to identify obstacles, or challenges, and 
then to address them one at the time – cleaning the slate as it were, so as to render 
a re-design of multilateralism viable. So what is our initial challenge? That is, which 
lacuna should be addressed fi rst?
Allow me this thought experiment. Following the order of the issues raised earlier, 
let me begin from a general plane, and allow me to break matters up, as it were: 
as has time and again been stressed, there is, in the international conjunctures of 
today, a multiplicity of international institutional actors, each with his own agendas, 
and in our daily chores we must as a rule engage with them in a multiplicity of 
dialogues – on a bilateral, a regional, and a global level. So here is the challenge: 
it is essential that we know how to tightly articulate both with and among them 
our global, regional and bilateral approaches – and that identify the extant positive 
feedbacks among them – rather than permitting them to erode and undermine us 
and each other. This is particularly pertinent when we think of the challenges of 
adapting multilateralism to the emerging multi-polarity of the international order. 
In Europe, we have been investing strongly in bilateral strategic dialogues with 
other regions and with individual countries, with a view to ensuring what has 
been called ‘the multi-lateralization of multi-polarity’ and, at that level, we need 
to ensure that there is a broad coherence of approach among our efforts and those 
of our partner entities – whoever these may be. The challenge, at this level, is one 
of congruence of strategic modes of approach.
A second challenge we run into when trying to set up the necessary mechanisms 
that will help us along in building an effective multilateralism concerns our 
efforts to articulate the different dimensions which have to be taken into account 
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when addressing a collective international problem and how we want to combine 
responses into what I would call effective multi-dimensionality9. An example of this is 
the need for articulation and coherence of our security and development agendas in terms 
of other engaging international (as well as national) actors at a multilateral level, to go for 
an obvious case. What do we understand by ‘strategic goals’? And how do we relate our 
vision of country and that of our regional integration entity (say, Europe) as a provider of 
global public goods for the fulfi llment of those strategic goals? These are questions which, 
in each and every case, must be addressed carefully and as fully as possible. Here, instead, 
the additional challenge, notice, is one of integration of planes of action.
A third challenge we face – in actual fact one which is a strong trigger of either 
effi cacy or ineffi cacy in what concerns multilateralism – is the integration of the 
idea of ownership and partnership into the multilateral equation, one that does 
not do so as a mere formality, but as an actual component, or a parcel, of the 
account. Or, to reframe it in slightly different terms, one that actually leads to the 
effective achievement of tangible results. This notion becomes clearer if formulated 
negatively: as I have read somewhere (I think the Herald Tribune, sometime in 
2007, as I was fl ying to the Balkans for a Conference) “there is no known case in 
History in which anyone washed a rental car”. At a more theoretical level (perhaps 
general plane would be a more accurate expression), if you will, this concerns the 
issue of the material concrete links established between what is now fashionable 
to call stakeholders, of course. At this third level of complexity in what concerns an 
effective multilateralism, the heart of the matter would then be, in other words, in 
the answer given to an implicit question: how do we integrate the perspective of 
our partners into our policies? Here, the challenge is clearly one of reciprocity and 
collective political participation.
Finally, and in a sort of fold, a matter of appraisal: how do we really – that is, 
how do we in practice – assess the effectiveness of multilateral engagements? Do 
we do it, this assessment, by the careful implementation of well-tested multilateral 
mechanisms, or instead by the achievement of results in the concrete cases? As has 
 9 Even if they appear to be similar mechanisms, multi-laterality and multi-polarity are very 
different things. A simple thought-experiment shows that clearly ad absurdum. Although it 
may be tempting to think of a matrix here, which would combine linearly multi-polarity 
and multi-laterality, this is not really so – it would not do, for example, to talk about the 
‘multi-polarization of multilateralism’ as a symmetrical arrangement to the ‘multi-lateralization 
of multi-polarity’ since, of course, that would require (or imply) the ‘coagulation’ of political 
blocks, be they regional or political-ideological ones. From a more inclusive perspective, we can 
say that it is precisely because ‘laterality’ and ‘polarity’ operate on different planes and exhibit 
different degrees of inclusiveness that multidimensionality is an attribute (or a property) of 
globalization.
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repeatedly been noted, this sounds like an almost technical question but in effect 
it is actually a highly political issue. Just think of the recent polemics around the 
ongoing fi nancial crisis and how evaluations have played there. The very defi nition 
of results is, not seldom, in itself a political issue – and this is frequently where 
things go wrong: when, for instance, we claim certain objectives as the ones we 
want to chase after, but we then, in reality, set up mechanisms that actually, 
knowingly or unknowingly, pursue, or result in, different consequences. Let me 
be concrete, here. Approaches carried out, in the EU context, to matters pertaining 
to the often over-rated European Neighbourhood Policy, or the establishment of 
Special Association Agreements, are a good case in point. As are sanctions policies, 
or international fi scal, or on the contrary, liberalizing, measures – they often have 
wholly unexpected results. This fourth and last challenge addresses, in turn, matters 
of functional and structural adequacy.
So here is a list of challenges for believers in multilateral paths to a rule-based 
international order. Does drawing up such a roll lend us a hand? Will facing up to 
these concrete gaps and fi lling them in one by one be enough for multilateralism 
to be rendered substantially more effi cacious – and thus our efforts more effi cient? 
A few litmus tests are in order, and I will turn to that next.
A few cases of EU engagement in various matters and in three regions, Africa, 
the Middle East, and the Mediterranean
A handful of European examples may be brought up, if only to simply illustrate 
more concretely what I have been trying to point out via this thought experiment, 
as I called it. Europe has been so keen, lately, in engaging in multilateralism as its 
choice strategy, that it is not diffi cult to pick and choose cases.
Engaging Russia, for instance, would be an obvious topic, particularly since 
the latest August 2008 invasion of Georgia and its subsequent recognition of the 
independence of ‘South Ossetia’ and ‘Abkhasia’. It would be easy too, for example, 
to look at Europe’s special mode of establishing foreign policy and diplomatic 
ties with China, or India – or to unveil the details of our push for mechanisms 
for containing global warming. For reasons of economy, and again following a 
well-worn template, I prefer to stick to three paradigmatic and more clear-cut 
cases, that of the EU’s involvement with Africa, the Middle East, and the Southern 
Mediterranean. I shall do this only superfi cially, rather than actually dig in to any 
depth; my aim is merely to characterize a modality of engagement, rather than 
attempting any in-depth analysis.
Armando Marques Guedes
 229 Nação e Defesa
Concerning involvement with these three very different regions, it is clear that 
we cannot yet develop anything like a blueprint, or even a handbook, of effective 
multilateralism. But keeping in mind what I have pointed out before, we can 
surely have an educated idea of what mechanisms and what type of internal and 
external thinking and coordination Europe actually needs if it is to put into motion 
the instruments necessary if we are to even hope to achieve our avowed objectives 
in these different contexts in which Europe is engaged. Or, instead, conclude that 
maybe this is either not a feasible path, or it is one that does not move fast enough 
to counteract the many challenges we must face. That is – and to be blunt – by 
testing our beliefs, we may easily identify gaps and lacunae in our endeavours.
Sub-Saharan Africa
In Africa the European Union now has a good window of opportunity in which 
to enhance effective multilateralism, and this is what underlines its commitment 
to the few decisions arrived at in the 2007 EU-Africa summit, and above all to 
the joint strategy and the other relevant documents. The existence of a timid but 
important regional integration process across the continent (the African Union, the 
AU), creating a counterpart with which to establish a strategic dialogue was an 
important step. This provides not only more ownership in the relationship but also a 
ground for rooting a European dialogue with the different interlocutors distributed 
on the continent, as well as with other non-African bilateral or multilateral actors. 
We should not focus so much on the engagement of Europe in Africa, but more on 
the engagement of Europe with Africa. This is an example of the issue of ownership 
through partnership10.
The Joint Strategy that EU and African leaders approved in Lisboa in December 
2007, at the tail-end of the third Portuguese Presidency, thin as it was, amounted to 
a direct answer to this concern. It implies a big shift in the paradigm of our relations 
with Africa. Not all went well. More than simply the Robert Mugabe issue, which 
divided the EU in what concerns the Summit (or, at least, led to an expectations 
demarcation of the UK and the Netherlands from the other member-States) and 
10 Something which has been a long time coming. It is not only that Africa was for a very long time 
now treated as an almost entirely passive recipient of aid in those areas Western donors found 
to be important. Even within Europe, to stay with this one example, for the tensions between 
the Commission and member-States as far as “aid” is concerned, see Maurizio Carbone (2007), 
The European Union and International Development. The Politics of Foreign Aid, Routledge.
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somewhat limited the scope of its ambitions, there was a largely unexpected 
anti-colonial rhetoric and posture for some African leaders which had a negative 
impact on the hopes raised for a full-fl edged partnership effort. Those were 
hindrances, to be sure.
But although much was left to be desired, this was not a wholly unsuccessful 
story. Even though things did certainly not go as smoothly as hoped for11, the 
different partnerships that will almost surely be launched as a result indicate that 
there are a number of issues/challenges that the two continents agree to tackle 
jointly – and, promisingly, in a framework of ownership through partnership. The 
multilateral approach of the new EU-Africa strategy is also evident in the efforts 
being made to reinforce institutional links between the two sides, placing the EU 
and the AU institutions at the core of the process, and cooperate in labouring to 
strengthen integration efforts in Africa.
How the EU shall manage to combine this multilateral approach with the 
important bilateral relations it and many of its member-States already have with 
some key African countries is one of the major challenges that the Union will face 
in the coming years. We can only hope the appropriate lessons have been learned. 
China and the US are moving in, so we now have competitors – will our model 
work better than theirs?
Middle East
The Middle East is another case in point. I shall be brief, here: in terms of results: 
looking back at EU engagement in the region for the last few years, it is clear that 
a multidimensional approach has been lacking. The EU is the most important 
donor to the Middle East, but it is not suffi ciently involved in other dimensions of 
engagement with the region, namely security and the regional and often diffi cult 
to tackle political matters.
The EU’s effort has mainly been geared to maintaining the multilateral framework 
(the so-called Quartet) – and results in this case mean mainly not being made 
subaltern and make sure we are capable of staying in the game rather than simply 
11 A recognition of this, at least at the public level, was sadly lacking. Both national and 
international accountability are still, unfortunately, not what they should be. The few critical 
voices which were raised concerning the lack of progress in the Summit were quickly accused 
of sabotaging an ongoing process: it seems that for many politicians, even those with anti 
neo-realist proclivities, ‘international anarchy’ provides an excellent excuse for forgetting basic 
democratic principles.
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being side-lined as irrelevant. The EU-Middle East pattern of engagement is also an 
example of how concrete results are dependent of other dynamics in which Europe, 
unfortunately – as a ‘herbivorous power’ – has not been capable of being more than 
a minor player12. Annapolis was a patent demonstration of this.
So the EU engagement on the Middle East has regrettably been more of a 
counter-example than an instance of effective multilateralism at work. But we would 
be bad students indeed if we do not put to good use the lessons learned there.
Mediterranean
The formal EU pro-active relationships with the Southern Mediterranean are 
indeed an interesting example of the Union’s multilateral approach to foreign 
policy. With NATO as the possible exception, the EuroMed Process is a policy 
that has no equivalent in the relations that other international players (the United 
States, for example) have with the various States in the Maghreb region. It is also 
multidimensional – the three baskets which compose the Barcelona Process since 
its inception13 do cover a wide range of areas; and their in-built feedback loops are 
such, that achievements in one area are bound to produce a spill-over effect for other 
areas. Perhaps because of the absence of any accession expectations, the EuroMed 
Process as a framework is, in a sense, a choice example of the EU’s multilateralism 
at work more than the European Neighbourhood Policy.
12 In spite of the hasty nomination of Tony Blair for a frontline role. It would be absurd to offer 
a bibliography for a theme and an area which have been the object of reams of published 
and unpublished materials. For a well balanced overview, it is suffi cient to read the small 
but exquisite,Pierre Levy (2006), Le Moyen Orient, Les Carnets du CAP (Centre d’Analyse et 
Prévision, Ministére des Affaires Étrangéres), Paris.
13 In the interests of the economy of the text, I do not want to go into too many details, but some 
comments and data are surely apposite here. In the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, celebrated in 
the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference during a Spanish Presidency of the EU Council 
of Ministers (the Conference was organized so as to strengthen EU billateral and multilateral 
relations with the countries in the Mashriq and the Maghreb regions), the Euro-Mediterranean 
partners established three main objectives for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which 
correspond to just as many ‘baskets’: 1. The defi nition of a common area of peace and stability 
through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue (this was called the Political and 
Security Basket); 2. The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and 
fi nancial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area (entitled the Economic 
and Financial Basket); and 3. The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural 
and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges 
between civil societies (the Social, Cultural and Human Basket). In a truly idealist Kantian 
Democratic Peace theory spirit, Javier Solana, then Spain’s Foreign Minister, called for the 
creation of a ‘ring of Friends’.
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Although, in good truth, not a very successful one, as there is a serious issue 
of ownership: thirteen years after Barcelona, we are still struggling to fi nd a 
framework for relations which our many Southern Mediterranean partners consider 
as in any strong sense their own, and there are enormous shortcomings in terms of 
South-South integration – so the attempts to export our model have not been at all 
successful. What is lacking, in this case? Does the fact that Southern partners, unlike 
EU neighbours to the East, have no membership prospects explain the failure? Are 
these the limits of the Union’s soft power strategy? Will Nicolas Sarkozy’s Union 
pour la Mediterrannée, now that Germany no more opposes it and as we are trying 
to actually establish it as a functioning institutional setting, work according to 
plan?14 Will Istanbul, or NATO?
So, note, in this as in the other examples, the stock which may be taken of our 
thought experiment is not famous. It is not even conclusive, as a matter of fact. And 
I do not think choosing other examples would make things better – we would still 
have to face up to the evidence we simply do not have a basis for
An overview and some conclusions
Trying to stick close to what I have been going on about, let me try to bring all 
this together in a more or less coherent whole and at a higher level of inclusiveness 
– or at least in a grander scheme. Given the crispness of my theme, I shall forego the 
temptation to summarize what I have said so far, namely the serious hesitations I 
have and the quasi-recipes I not so obliquely suggested in my thought experiment. 
In what follows, I will simply attempt placing my considerations in wider historical 
14 Of all the possible bibliography, a few articles will suffi ce which touch on most of the points 
made: Sinem Akgül Açikmeşe (2005), “Management of Security in EU’s Neighborhood:
Union’s Tactics Revisited”, Perceptions: 1-25; Andreas Marchetti (2006), “Widening without 
Enlarging. The European Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus”. The unpublished 
pape ris available (29th October 2008) at the site of the European Stability Initiative at,
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=yu&id=198; Ingo Peters and Jan Bittner (2006), “EU–US 
Risk Policy in the European Neighborhood: the cases of Moldova and Georgia”, in (ed.) Kari 
Möttöla, Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, Brookings Institution; and Michelle 
Comelli (2007), “Building Security in its Neghbourhood through the European Neighbourhood 
Policy?”, in European Union Studies Association (EUSA), an unpublished paper presented at the 
10th Biennial Conference, May 17-19, Montreal, Canada. The full text is available (29th October 
2008) at http://aei.pitt.edu/7787/01/comelli-m-02b.pdf. See also Armando Marques Guedes 
(2009), A Guerra dos Cinco Dias. A Invasão da Geórgia pela Federação Russa, Instituto de Estudos 
Superiores Militares e Prefácio, Ministério da Defesa, Lisboa [preface by Admiral Álvaro Sabino 
Guerreiro].
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and analytical frameworks. So rather than offer a ‘solution’ I shall restrain myself 
to trends as concerns effi cacy and legitimacy, which I envisage as a background to 
what I have discussed so far.
I want to begin by reiterating that it is certainly no news to stress the evidence 
that we have been, for quite a while now, witnessing a marked propensity for 
increased multilateralism. Allow me, nevertheless to give this largely cumulative 
process a sort of brief genealogical rundown, highlighting some of its markers, as 
it were. This is an easy endeavour, as a matter of fact, as for our purposes here, a 
cursory glimpse will be suffi cient. After slow motion stutters in the Vienna Congress 
in 1815 and the installation (allow me to call it that) of ‘conference diplomacy’ 
from then on – in what was called the Concert of Europe – we have, indeed, seen 
it coming of age all throughout the ‘short 20th Century’ (the period that begun in 
1914 in Sarajevo, or even 1918-1919 in Versailles, and that ended, at best in 1989, 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ‘Wall of Shame’, and, at worst, in 1991, with the 
implosion of the Soviet Union. After a brief ‘unilateral moment’, to coin a variation 
on the famed ‘unipolar moment’ idea, the 21st Century saw a rather acute speeding 
up of this process of multi-lateralization. Perhaps one of the reasons for this was 
an unforeseen consequence of the new ‘uni-multipolarity’ which arose. As things 
went, the dismantlement of the USSR and the end of the bipolar world order led to 
the then curiously unexpected fact that both a ‘multidimensionality of planes’ and a 
multicultural layer were increasingly added on to this multilateralization. Because of 
this, the stakes have been raised for both legitimacy and effi cacy, of course – they 
are now much tougher to achieve.
Unfortunately, that is not the only manner in which stakes have been raised. 
Having already looked at multidimensionality, it is proper to now focus a little 
of the associated multiculturality, something I have not really looked at yet. I say 
curiously unexpected because, of course, with hindsight, it appears to have been 
inevitable – I do not mean to sound like a Huntingtonian here, advocating the 
inexorableness of the emergence of ‘civilizational blocs’, much less like a Spenglerian 
defender of a world checkered by ‘great civilizations’; but it is surely interesting to 
note in passing that feelings of inevitability tend to be prospective, not retrospective, 
and so this mid-90s feeling constitutes a fascination, as a reversal of that common 
pattern. At any rate, there you are, the 90s spelled multilateralism enhanced plus 
multiculturalism emergent.
One predicament we must face up to is that such increased complexity is here 
to stay – in fact, there is a lot going on suggesting the trend might even accelerate. 
Much indicates these systemic pressures will continue unabated in the 21st Century 
– and at the risk of making a banal assertion, let me emphasize that they embody 
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what we may perhaps safely look at as largely irreversible trends for global 
integration on the one hand, and on the other for some multi-polarity. Given the rise 
of regional integration processes as both a stepping stone toward global integration 
and a mechanism of resistance to it, we should also expect this progression to be a 
multi-level affair. So it is to be expected that the resulting tendencies shall continue to 
be felt and shall push us for an ever more multilateral and multicultural diplomacy, 
even as the realities of power continue to eat away at its fringes.
This predictably laborious and non-linear progression will not, I believe, really 
amount to a trivial affair, since when quantitative change reaches a critical mass it 
normally turns qualitative. In other words, albeit eroded and slowed down by State 
resistances, multilateralism will continue to enhance its centrality and possibly come 
to take center-stage in world politics. But it will not be the old multilateralism. 
And it will less and less appear to us as a suffi cient solution – as more and more 
it will be seen as a structural feature of the ongoing slow-motion transition from 
an international system into an international society.
So it still has implications, but, I want to argue, following my EU examples, as 
a path rather than as a panacea. Now, without going so far as detailing what should 
be included in future versions of a more attuned European Security Strategy, allow 
me to take an additional step. Should that be the case, we must be ready for a novel 
type of diplomacy to come about. As has often been stressed, that future landscape 
will bring to the fore new questions of both effi cacy and legitimacy, given that 
the changes which are inevitably going to occur as concerns the very bases for 
relationships among States and between States and other emergent international 
actors. Moreover, the seemingly inexorable rise of what Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye famously called, back in 1977, complex interdependence between international 
actors15 will undoubtedly change things even further – so it is not unlikely, I believe, 
that we shall be faced with major changes on the defi nition itself of what will be 
an effi cient multilateralism – as well as on our view of what multilateralism in 
actuality is. Multilateralism will surely increase; but it will do so as a new rule of 
the game, not as a magic wand we must simply perfect for it to actually fulfi ll its 
healing tasks. I would venture to say such changes are very likely indeed. And 
those non-trivial changes will surely render effi cacy and legitimacy into targets 
which will become much harder to reach.
15 Without adhering totally to their perspective (or rather, to its applicability to the complexities 
of contemporary ‘globalization’) I am alluding, of course, to the nowadays classical work of 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (2000, original 1977), Power and Interdependence, 3rd 
edition, Longman.
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I do not want to go into this in detail here, but just look at it from the perspective 
of negotiations, for example. What is clear is that zero-sum games are going to become 
rarer and rarer in the upcoming international panoramas – which simply means, 
mostly, that accommodations will become more and more imperative, precisely as 
they are rendered more diffi cult to swallow, to use a metaphor, given the brute fact 
of the multiculturality of the context in which they take place. That is, because they 
shall most probably become more and more alien to our ‘background’ point of view 
and preferences as they in a more and more sustained manner arise out of other 
preferences and points of view. Note, by the way, the fascinating asymmetry here, 
as concerns the emergence of this multiculturality: alterity will be felt by Western 
diplomats as they have to, say, take into account Indian or Chinese, or Brazilian 
and Russian outlooks and modes of operating [to use only a few BRIC examples] 
and not simply their own; while Russians, Brazilians, Chinese and Indians will, 
for the fi rst time, within the modern Westphalian State system, be able to help 
defi ne the negotiating playing fi eld; rather than, as has always so far been the case, 
be forced to play by rules almost in their entirety defi ned by Western powers. In 
both cases, notice, much will change; namely at the plane of their ‘geometry of 
accommodations’, to coin another concept.
Going back to my theme, this, of course, raises further obstacles and challenges 
to the establishment of an effective and legitimate multilateralism which aims to 
promote, as its horizon, the building of an institutional-and rule-based international 
society. Obstacles which add to those more ‘localized’ ones I earlier broached. This 
is something the EU and other entities bent on multilateralism would do well to 
take into full account. The challenge, here, is more generic, in a sense, and it is one 
of drawing and erecting a common language for exchanges and accommodations.
So, to cap things off, can we go further still? I believe we can, indeed, identify, or 
at least circumscribe, more diffi culties which need to be addressed and surmounted 
if we are to hope for a more effective multilateralism with our feet well planted on 
the ground, so to speak. I am not sure more than that is feasible. The changes I have 
been mapping loom large on the horizon. Institutions, largely mechanisms designed 
for domesticating change, tend to often display great diffi culties in dealing with it; 
and so this cannot but mean trouble, domestically-generated trouble. One example 
will stand for all. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, like most if not all governmental 
organizations, run by addressing conventional wisdom, not by challenging it. So 
their tendency is, quite naturally, to manage crises in terms of familiar patterns. And 
here lies the problem: increasingly, that will not do. So MFAs and their diplomats 
will in the predictable near future be faced with losses both at the level of effi cacy 
and at that of legitimacy, as formal inadequacy of one sort or another eventually 
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sets in. Sooner or later, they will be pushed to adapt to the structurally changed 
circumstances in the cavalcade of complex interdependence thickening up will surely 
bring on us all. Note that that is not simply a matter of having to address more 
entities, and ever different types of an increasing number of entities – regional and 
global governance ones, formatted anew, will also increasingly make themselves 
felt, and therefore playing the diplomatic game shall, as a result, be deeply altered 
as concerns its very rules. I want to be very clear here: one concerns the relationship 
between “soft” and “hard” forms of power – and this is unfortunately something the 
pious belief on multilateralism per se, as a panacea, does not allows us to really see. 
We must be ready to face up to the evidence that we are now facing an international 
system in transition which is likely to turn our environment into one much more 
unpredictable than it perhaps ever was. And we must get ready for the adaptive 
moves that demands of us. This will only be possible if the new European External 
Action Service is designed in a manner suffi ciently fl exible to fi t into the new and 
fast-changing political ecosystem in which we all now fi nd ourselves – in other words, 
if it is tuned into a revamped European Security Strategy. The challenge, then, is 
also one of learning to assume a stance of a wide-band preventative matter-of-factness.
This, in actual fact, is precisely the type of thing ‘modern’ diplomacy was 
designed for in the 17th Century. It is up to you to make sure diplomacy does not 
wither away into insignifi cance, but is, once more, changed into a novel and more 
robust format, as it historically so often did. This, too, is what foreign policies have 
changed since time immemorial. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defense, 
corps diplomatiques and foreign policy makers are surely among the entities and 
organisms which should take good note of that as quickly as possible – by raising 
a new breed of diplomats capable of meeting the new challenges is urgent. May 
we be up to the task, and blaze the new trails rather than just buy into recipes we 
cannot be sure are adequate ones, and whose track-record is not too convincing.
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